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SAVE
may

in

extremely rare cases,^ where the mind, like a mirror,

passively reflects external impressions, intellectual activity
always be reduced to one of the two following types asso:

ciating, combining, unifying

;

or dissociating, isolating,

and sepa-

These cardinal operations underlie all forms of cognition,
from the lowest to the highest, and constitute its unity of comporating.

sition.
It is a normal and
Abstraction belongs to the second type.
necessary process of the mind, dependent on attention, i. e., on
the limitation, willed or spontaneous, of the field of consciousness.

The

act of abstraction implies in its genesis negative

conditions, and

The

is

and positive

the result of both.

negative conditions consist essentially in the fact that

we

cannot apprehend more than one quality or one aspect, varying
according to the circumstances, in any complex whole, because
consciousness, like the retina, is restricted to a narrow region of

—

clear perception.

The positive condition is a state which has been appropriately
termed a "psychical reinforcement" of that which is being abstracted, and it is naturally accompanied by a weakening of that
which is abstracted from. The true characteristic of abstraction
While involving elimination,
is this partial increment of intensity.
The elements or qualities
it is actually a positive mental process.
of a percept or a representation which we omit do not necessarily
We leave them out of account simply
involve such suppression.
because they do not suit our ends for the moment, and are complementary.^
1 Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.
For example, in moments of surprise and in states approximating to pure sensation.
SSchmidkunz, Ueber dit Abstraction. Halle: Strieker, 1889. This little work of forty-three
pages contains a good historical and theoretical exposition of the question.

2

;

ABSTRACTION PRIOR TO SPEECH.

I5

Abstraction being, then, in spite of negative appearances, a
positive operation,

sary to

it,

but

intensity, but

it is

it is

how are we to conceive it? Attention is necesmore than attention. It is an augmentation of
more than an augmentation of intensity. Sup-

a-\- b-\- c^=d.
To abstract from b
{b -\- c).
If this
would ostensibly give a
so, b and c would be retained unaltered in consciousness
On the other hand, since it is imthere would be no abstraction.
possible for the whole representation d to be suppressed outright,
They subsist, accordingly,
b and c cannot be totally obliterated.
in a residual state which may be termed x, and the abstract representation is hence not a but a -\- x or A. Thus the elements of abstract representations are the same as those of concrete represen-

pose a group of representations

and c
were

=d —

in favor of a,

;

only some are strengthened, others weakened whence
new groupings. Abstraction, accordingly, consists in the
formation of new groups of representations which, while strengthening certain elements of the concrete representations, weaken
tations

:

;

arise

other elements of the same.^

We

see from the above that abstraction depends genetically

upon the causes which awaken and sustain

attention.

I

have de-

scribed these causes elsewhere, ^ and cannot here return to their
consideration.

remark that abstraction,

It is sufficient to

attention,

like

may

be instinctive, spontaneous, and natural or reflective, voluntary,
and artificial. In the first category the abstraction of a quality or
;

mode
hence

met

of existence originates in
it is

common

a

we

with, as

some

attraction, or

manifestation of intellectual

shall see,

among many

from
and

utility

life

is

of the lower animals.

even
In

second form, the rarer and more exalted, it proceeds less from
the qualities of the object than from the will of the subject it presupposes a choice, an elimination of negligible elements, which is
often laborious, as well as the difficult task of maintaining the abstract element clearly in consciousness.
In fine, it is always a special application of the attention which, adapted as circumstances

its

;

1

Schmidkunz,

This author, who rightly

loc. cit.

upon the positive character of ab
no concept, not even
"in order to deduce
necessary to abstract from that thing

insists

straction (which is too frequently considered as a negation) observes that

that of infinity,

is

in its psychological genesis the result of negation, for,

from the idea of a
its
it

finite

quality of finality,
is

thing the idea of infinity,

which

which is a positive process
negation."
2

is

it is first

certainly a positive act; subsequently, in order to reach infinity,

sufficient either constantly to increase the time,
;

Psychology of Attention.

magnitude, and intensity of the finite
which is tantE(mount to denying the

or to deny the limits of the finite,
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require to observation, synthesis, action, etc., here functions as an
instrument of analysis.
A deeply-rooted prejudice asserts that abstraction is a mental
act of relative infrequency.
This fallacy obtains in current par-

where "abstract" is a synonym of difficult, obscure, inacThis is a psychological error resulting from an incom-

lance,

cessible.

plete view

abstraction

all

:

The

forms.

is

illegitimately reduced to its higher

faculty of abstracting, from the lowest to the highest

constantly the same

development is dependent on
language but it exists in embryo even in those primitive operations which are properly concerned with the concrete, i. e., perception and representation.
Several recent authors have emphasised this point.^
Perception is par excelleiice the faculty of cognising the
degrees,

is

that of (general) intelligence

concrete.

It strives to

its

:

and

embrace

of

;

the qualities of

all

out completely succeeding, because

its

object with-

held in check by an inter-

it is

—

the natural tendency of the mind to simplify and to elimThe same horse, at a given moment, is not perceived in the
same manner by a jockey, a veterinary surgeon, a painter and a
tyro.
To each of these, certain qualities, which vary individually,
nal foe,
inate.

stand in

relief,

and others recede into the background.

Except in
we have

cases of methodical and prolonged investigation (where
observation, and not perception) there
gether,

mainspring

lect

the

—

i.

always an unconscious

of

gotten that perception
its

is

some principal characteristics which, grouped
become a substitute for the totality. It must not be

selection

e.,

is

is

pre- eminently a practical operation, that

interest or utility,

and that

in

consequence we negwhatever at

leave in the field of obscure consciousness

moment concerns

would be superfluous

to

tofor-

—

neither our desires nor our purposes.

review

all

It

the forms of perception (visual,

show that they are governed by this
same law of utility but it should be remarked that the natural
mechanism by which the strengthened elements and the weakened
elements are separated, is a rude cast of what subsequently becomes abstraction, that the same forces are in play, and are ultimately reducible to some definite direction given to the attention.
auditory, tactual, etc.), and to
;

With

the image, the intermediate stage between percept and

concept, the reduction of the object represented to a few funda-

mental features,

is still

more marked.

the different representations which

I

Not merely is there among
of some man, dog,

may have

or tree, one that for the time being necessarily excludes the others
ISee especially Hoeffding, Psychologic. German translation. Second Edition, pp.

223 et seq.
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(my oak tree perforce appears to me in summer foliage, tinted by
autumn, or bereft of leaves, in bright light or in shade), but even
this individual, concrete representation which prevails over the

—

no more than a sketch, a reduction of reality with many
Apart from the exceptionally gifted men in whom
mental vision and mental audition are perfect, and wholly commensurate (as it would seem) with perception, the representations
which we call exact are never so, except in their most general feaCompare the image we have, with our eyes closed, of a
tures.
others

is

details omitted.

monument with the perception of the monument itself the remembrance of a melody with its vocal or instrumental execution.
;

In the average man, the image, the would-be copy of reality invariably suffers a conspicuous impoverishment,

the less lavishly

endowed

;

it is

which

is

enormous

in

here reduced to a mere schema,

limited to the inferior concepts.

Doubtless

it

may be

objected that the work of dissociation in

perception and representation

incomplete and partial.

is

be strange and illogical indeed
the very heart of the concrete

It

would

the abstract were to triumph in

if

we do but submit that it is here in
germ, in embryonic shape. And hence, when abstraction appears
in its true form, as the consciousness of one unique quality isolated
from the rest, it is no new manifestation but a fruition, it is a sim;

plification of simplifications.

The

state of consciousness thus attained,

tention on one quality exclusively, and by

from the

rest,

by the
its

fixation of at-

ideal dissociation

becomes, as we know, a notion which is neither inand this is the material of gen-

dividual nor general, but abstract,

—

eralisation.

The sense
blances,

of

identity, the

as has justly

is,

thinking"; without

it

been

power of apprehending resem"the keel and backbone of our

said,

we should be

lost in the incessant

stream of

nature any complete resemblances, any abIt might be
It is extremely doubtful.
solutely similar events?
supposed that a person who reads a sentence several times in suc-

things.^

cession,

Are there

who

in

same air, who tastes all
would experience in each case

listens several times to the

same
perception.
But

the four quarters of the

fruit,

an identical

this is not so.

show

A

little

that besides differences in time, in the varying

reflexion will

moods

of the

and in the cumulative effect of repeated perceptions, there
is at least between the first perception and the second, that radical
difference which separates the new from the repeated. In fact, the
subject,

1

W. James,

Psychology. '%^o\.

I,,

p. 459.

—
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material given us by external and internal experience consists of
resemblances alloyed by differences which vary widely in degree,
The perfect resemblance assumed bein other words, analogies.
tween things vanishes as we come to know them better. At first
sight a

new people

exhibits to the traveller a well-determined gen-

more he observes, the more apparent uni"I have taken the trouble,"
says Agassiz, "to compare thousands of individuals of the same
eral type

formity
species

is

;

later,

;

the

resolved into varieties.

in

one case

I

pushed the comparison so

far as to

have

placed side by side 27,000 specimens of one and the same shell
(genus Neretina). I can assure you that in these 27,000 specimens
I

did not find two that were perfectly alike."

grasping resemblances

Is this faculty of

— primitive,

— the substrate of gen-

word ?
awakening of the mind, in point of cognition? For several contemporary writers (Spencer, Bain, Schneider, and others) the consciousness of difference is the primordial
factor; the consciousness of resemblance comes later.
Others uphold the opposite contention.^ As a matter of fact this quest for
ihe primuni cognituni is beyond our grasp like all genetical questions, it eludes our observation and experience.
No conclusion can be formed save on purely logical arguments, and each side advances reasons that carry a certain weight.
There is, moreover, at the bottom of the whole discussion, the
grave error of identifying the embryonic state of the mind with its
adult forms, and of presupposing a sharp initial distinction between discrimination and assimilation. The question must remain
open, incapable of positive solution by our psychology.
The ineralisation

Does

it

mark the

in the absolute

signification of the

first

;

contestable truth with regard to the mind, as

veloped and organised

state, is that

we know

it

in its de-

the two processes advance

pari passu, and are reciprocally causative.
In sum, abstraction and generalisation considered as elementary acts of the mind, and reduced to their simplest conditions, in-

volve two processes
I.

The

:

former,

abstraction,

implies a

dissociative

—

process,

1 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology.
Vol. I., Part 2, Chapter H. Bain (in the last
chapter of Emotions and Will says that nothing more fundamental can possibly be assigned as
a mark of intelligence than the feeling of difference between consecutive or co-existing impressions. " There are cases, however, where agreement imparts the shock requisite for rousing the
intellectual wave but it is agreement so qualified as to be really a mode of difference. For
review and ample discussion of this problem see Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, Chapter XIV.
The earlier psychologists, in considering the ''faculty of comparison'
which acts by resemblance and difference, as primordial, had observed the same fact, although
they described it in different terrns.
)

;
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operating on the raw data of experience.

which are ultimately reducible
causes which may be due to the

to

It

ig

has subjective causes
It has objective

attention.

fact that a determinate quality is

given us as an integral part of widely different groups.
''Any total impression whose elements are never experienced
apart must be unanalysable.

cold things were wet and

all wet
and no non-liquid were
transparent, we should scarcely discriminate between coldness and
wetness and scarcely ever invent separate names for liquidity and
transparency.
What is associated now with one thing and now
with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow
into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind.
One might
call this the law of dissociation by varying concomitants." ^
2. The latter, generalisation, originates in association by resemblance, but even in its lowest degree it rises beyond this, since

things cold,

if

all

.

it

.

If all

liquids were transparent

.

implies a synthetic act of fusion.

It

does not, in

fact, consist in

the successive excitation of similar or analogous percepts, as in the

case where the image of St. Peter's in

Rome

suggests to

me

that

London, of the Pantheon in Paris, and of other
churches with enormous dimensions, of like architecture, and with
gigantic domes.
It is a condensation. The mind resembles a cruof St. Paul's in

cible with a precipitate of

common

resemblances at the bottom,

while the differences have been volatilised.

In proportion as

we

recede from this primitive and elementary form, the constitution

demands other psychological conditions which
cannot be hastily enumerated.
And thus we reach the principal aim of our inquiry which
purports, not to reinforce the time-worn dispute as to the nature
of abstraction and generalisation, but to pursue these operations step by step in their development, and multiform aspects.
Directly we pass beyond pure individual representation we reach
an ascending scale of notions which, apart from the general character possessed by all, are extremely heterogeneous in their nature, and imply distinct mental habits.
The question so often discussed as to "What takes place in the mind when we are thinking
by general ideas?" is not to be disposed of in one definite answer,
but finds variable response according to the circumstances.
In
order to give an adequate reply, the principal degrees of this scale
must first be determined. And for this we require an objective
notation which shall give them some external, though not arbitrary,
mark.
of the general idea

'i-'^ .^|2^a.&%,

Psychology.

Vol.

I.,

pp. 502 and 506.
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The first distinguishing mark is given by the absence or presence of words. Abstraction and generalisation, with no possible
aid from language, constitute the inferior group which some recent
writers have designated by the appropriate name oi generic images'^
a term which clearly shows their intermediate nature between
the pure image, and the general notion, properly so called.
The second class, which we have termed intermediate abstraction, implies the use of words.
At their lowest stage these concepts hardly rise above the level of the generic image they can be
reduced to a vague schema, in which the word is almost a superfluous accompaniment.
At a stage higher the parts are inverted
the representative schema becomes more and more impoverished,
and is obliterated by the word, which rises in consciousness to the

—

:

:

rank.
Finally, the third class, that of the higher concepts, has for its
distinguishing mark that it can no longer be represented.
If any
image arises in consciousness it does not sensibly assist the movement of thought, and may even impede it. Everything, appar-

first

ently, at least, is subordinated to language.
This enumeration of the stages of abstraction can for the pres-

ent only be given roughly and broadly.
Every phase of its
evolution should be studied in itself, and accurately determined by
its internal and external characteristics.
As to the legitimacy, the
objective and practical value, of this schematic distribution, nothing less than a detailed exploration from one end to the other of
our subject, can confirm or overthrow it.
shall go over certain of the lower forms, dwelling upon
these at some length, because they are usually neglected, or altogether omitted. This is the pre-linguistic period of abstraction and
generalisation words are totally wanting they are an unknown
factor.
How far is it possible without the aid of language to transcend the level of perception, and of consecutive images, and to
attain a more elevated intellectual standpoint ? In replying empirically, we have three fairly copious sources of information
animals, children who have not yet acquired speech, and uneducated
deaf-mutes.
shall speak of this in subsequent articles.

We

:

;

:

We

IThistermis borrowed from the well-known works
which are scarcely more than twenty years old. Huxley

of Galton on composite photographs,
in his book on Hume (Chapter IV.) appears to be the first who introduced it into psychology, as shown by the following passage
" This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what takes place in the
formation of compound photographs when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example,
are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one
portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are brought out
strongly, while all those in which they differ are left vague and thus what maybe termed a
generic portrait of the six is produced. Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are incomplete in another way that is to say, they are generic.
And hence it follows that our ideas ot
the impressions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those impressions
while at the-same" time they may exist in the mind independently of language." Romanes employs the'word " recept " for " generic images," as marking their intermediate place between the
"percept " which is below, and the " concept" which is above them.
:

—

;

;

.

.

.

;

